Archive for improper posteriors

miXtures on arXiv

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on February 5, 2025 by xi'an

A paper about Bayesian inference on mixtures was posted on arXiv last week, as of 13 Jan 2025.  Fast sampling and model selection for Bayesian mixture models, by M. E. J. Newman is based on the notion that (genuine) parameters of a mixture model can be marginalized out when using conjugate priors. This is something that we pointed out quite a while ago, in a 1999 paper with George and Marty, which was devised in a long ride from Baltimore to Cornell after JSM 1999, and again in the 2002 Series B perfect sampling paper with George, Kerrie and Mike. (Also written in 1999.) And marginal likelihood can furthermore be approximated along this way as discussed in the more recent papers Bayesian Inference on Mixtures of Distributions with Kate, Kerrie & Jean-Michel, as well as Approximating the marginal likelihood in mixture models with Jean-Michel.

“Standard mixture models, as commonly formulated, also suffer from a technical, but important, difficulty: the existence of empty components. In many models (…) the number of observations in a component can be zero. Arguably this is acceptable for a model with a fixed number of components, but when the number of components is a free random variable it causes ambiguity, because a given division of observations into components can be represented in more than one way in the model. For instance, we could divide observations into two components, or we could divide them into three components, one of which is empty. This in turn creates difficulties when estimating the number of components—do we have two components or three?”

A very puzzling perspective, imho, since potentially empty components are inherent to (both finite and infinite) mixture models with connected issues of prohibiting some improper priors (if not all) and non-identifiability, including non-identifiability of the number of empty components (which remains random conditional on the data!), but different numbers of components lead to different models and their comparison is handled straightforwardly by a Bayesian analysis.

The author then proceeds to “prohibit empty components” [as a prior choice ?] as we did in the original (!) Gibbs sampler for mixtures in 1990 (published in 1994 in Series B!), seeking posterior properness, a trick later validated by Larry Wasserman (in again 1999, the year of mixtures!). Who called the construct the combination of a fixed prior and of a pseudo-likelihood, correctly imho (as the data dependent part is not properly normalised by a function of the parameters), rather than a prior choice. (The very one who stated that “mixtures, like tequila, are evil and should be avoided“.)

From there, the modelling is rather standard, with an arbitrary prior on k, number of components, a random partition model that prohibits empty components, even though the constraint could be more stringent depending on the number of parameters of a given component and the degree of improperness of the prior, as in our 1990 Series B paper. (Impropriety is not discussed in the paper.) Bayesian inference on k is based on the simulated (pseudo-)posterior. The choice therein as the estimated clustering is the most frequent partition (consensus clustering), connected to our proposal of (again!) 1999 with Merrilee and Gilles. While the estimated mixture is not explicited. The approach is assessed as running at an O(k) cost, with no parallel in terms of the data size n, even though the examples include a 59,946 dataset. One notable algorithmic trick when moving k is in selecting a component at random first rather than an observation index.

Some minor issues: detailed balance indicated as required for convergence (p14), label switching is called component switching (p5), higher acceptance rate indicated as meaning improved performances (p7)

mixture models [book review]

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on August 14, 2024 by xi'an

Strangely enough, I became aware of this new book on mixtures through one of these annoying emails “Your work has been cited n times this week“… Mixture Models (Parametric, Semiparametric, and New Directions) by Weixin Yao and Sijia Wang got published by CRC Press earlier this year, within the Monographs on Statistics and Applied Probability green series (#175), and covers across 380 pages most aspects of mixture (and hidden Markov) estimation, if with strong emphasis on maximum likelihood estimation, while the new directions are unsurprisingly those pursued by the authors, namely robust and semi-parametric estimation, as well as model selection by testing.

An early warning about this book review is that I co-edited a Handbook of Mixture Analysis with my friends Sylvia Früwirth-Schnatter and Gilles Celeux a few years ago. I am therefore biased in what I would have included in a new book on the topic, the more because I find the available literature already plentiful, even though the early (1984) book of Titterington et al. that was my entry to the field may have become an historical reference. For instance, Finite Mixtures by McLachlan and Peel (2000) remains relevant, with similar emphasis on maximum likelihood and the EM algorithm, while Sylvia’s Finite Mixture and Markov Switching Models is still a reference to this day.

And an additional warning on me not being a massive fan of semi- and non-parametric estimation in this setting…

Preliminaries that may explain my limited enthusiasm about the book and its limited originality. Not that I found significant errors there (even though “improper priors [do not always] yield improper posteriors” [p.145] as we demonstrated in several papers), however, I had trouble with the uneven pace adopted by the authors that often skim some topics of importance while spending an inconsiderate amount of space on less relevant once. Some items get many bibliographical references, while others do not. For instance, EM receives a lion’s share (see, e..g, Sections 6.6 and 6.7). Or the 12 pages of proof in Chapter 10. Declination of sections into mixtures, mixtures of regressions, multivariate mixtures, hidden Markov models, and so on feels somewhat repetitive. This is particularly the case for the “mixture regression models” chapter.

The book also contains Bayesian entries, with a first introduction (p.105) in the discrete data chapter that precedes the short Bayesian chapter #4 (p.145), the same issue arising for related algorithms like Gibbs (p.107) that “estimate properties of the joint posterior” and MCMC (p.112). Which sort of erases the specificity of a Bayesian approach by reducing it to one item in the toolbox (with the wrong stress on MAP estimates). In this Bayesian chapter, MCMC validation is handled for discrete state spaces while applied in general spaces. The focus is mostly on relabelling for the following label switching chapter, albeit a large collection of methods are compared if not mentioned.

Handing an unknown number of components by hypothesis testing is supported in the next short chapter, although very little is said about reversible jump MCMC. And there is no general discussion on the consistency of these tests, in particular with bootstrap. Or at least on the regularity conditions they request. An puzzling paradox (p.191) is the existence of an unbounded Fisher information of an exponential mixture

\pi\mathcal Exp(1)+(1-\pi)\mathcal Exp(2)

when the weight π is the parameter (and close to 1).

High-dimensional mixtures in Chapter 8 are mostly handled by linear projections in smaller subspaces, which is natural given that they preserve the mixture structure but open a Pandora box of a wide range of proposed methods, again with little comparison available. Except in the R final section opposing several R functions on the same dataset (if unconclusively).

The semi-parametric chapters mention Dirichlet process priors, albeit briefly, but fail to relate to the recent works on using these when inferring about the number of components. Or failing to do so. There is also a very limited connection pointed out with machine learning but little can be gathered from the three page presentation (pp.308-310). These chapters also have significant overlap with the review paper of Xiang et al. (2019) in Statistical Science.

Most chapters end up with an R section, which usually reads as a quick demo of a related R package, like BayesLCA or our own mixtool. Hence not massively helpful beyond pointers to these packages. The numerical illustrations also are unevenly distributed between chapters, from nothing at all to four pages of small font tables on an MSE comparison between more or less robust approaches undertaken by Yu et al. (2020).

The above thus explains why I am not particularly excited about this bibliographical addition to the analysis of mixtures. It does offer a reference for researchers in the field by adding recent references and approaches to the existing books mentioned above, but I could not recommend it as a textbook (as suggested on p.xiii).

[Disclaimer about potential self-plagiarism: this post or an edited version may eventually appear in my Books Review section in CHANCE.]

Objective Bayesian Inference [book review]

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on July 2, 2024 by xi'an

As advertised earlier on the ‘Og, the reference book on reference priors and relatives by my long-time friends Jim Berger, José Bernardo, and Dongchu Sun is at last out! I received a copy from the editor, World Scientific, and read through it, mostly in train rides to Normandy and Brittany. The construction of this book took decades and I remember many O’Bayes meetings when we were discussing of the progress made that far. As I knew from a few months back that the book was at last completed, I was quite eager to dig into it. And get this review ready for ISBA 2024. Given this prior knowledge, completed with sequential observations, I thus fear my review will be far from objective! And most likely more critical than it should be as fantasying how I would have written a book on that topic…

“Some of the best statisticians (not named Fisher or Neyman)…” (p1)

The book covers traditional approaches to principled ways of selecting prior distributions, culminating with the reference prior introduced by José Bernardo in his PhD thesis in the late 1970’s and expanded by all three authors over their academic careers. (Why is the acute accent missing from José on the front pages?!) The cover connects to the three founding fathers of objective Bayesian inference, Bayes, Laplace, and Jeffreys. The contents are not overly surprising from a personal viewpoint, i.e. as a card-carrying O’Bayes member. Namely that the chapters set the scene of parametric models and Bayesian inference (“a data driven probability transformation machine”), mostly supported by decision theory (including intrinsic losses!) but skipping testing and (mostly) model choice. This is unsurprisingly in the same spirit as Berger (1985) and Bernardo & Smith (1992). Not covering advanced Bayesian asymptotics, any flavour of Bayesian nonparametrics, the more recent generalized Bayesian inference, and the impact of misspecified models. The likelihood section does not mention Deborah Mayo’s criticism of the Likelihood Principle, or the Pitman Koopman lemma (although the examples are predominantly connected with exponential families).  The section (1.8) on MCMC implies that the Metropolis algorithm is less accurate that the Gibbs sampler, which is an exaggerated generalisation from a simple example, accrued by a comparison that does not seem to account for mixing behaviours.

“Our own belief is that the effort [seeking objective prior distributions] is a misguided search for the holy grail” (p.68)

The basics of objective priors repeats the useful warning that a truncation of parameter space is far from advised, as is the call for vague proper priors à la BUGS (a “nonsense”). A remark on the alternative weakly informative priors à la BDA require subjective input, a whole section on the legitimacy of improper priors as KL limits of sequences of proper priors. Plus a nice recall of the data dependent prior of Wasserman (2000) forcing mixtures to avoid empty clusters. This was the prior Jean Diebolt and I implemented in our 1990 Gibbs sampling paper. (I do not really see it as data dependent to impose that no component comes empty in the sample, but rather as a different model removing some terms from the likelihood.) There is even a chapter dedicated to constant priors—the historical meaning of inverse probability—, with a section on the modern advocates of this constant prior, that mostly focus on Binomial model. The book goes on justifying this prior by an invariance under reparameterisation argument (p108), but the discussion may seem stretched for some newcomers. This is followed by a nice chapter on frequentist matching, covering the bivariate Normal case and some asymptotics, followed by confidence distributions, quite topical and then fiducial inference, that imagines a posterior without a prior, one short too short chapter on invariance priors arguing for the right-Haar vs the left-Haar prior measure in invariance settings as exact matching, completed by a useful if short chapter—I would not have thought of including—on the performances of objective priors, like over-dispersion or under-dispersion. A mention is made there of the (now well-known) danger of using MCMC with improper posteriors as the issue potentially goes undetected, as it did in the early 1990s. Within its coherence section, the authors recall the fundamentals of the lovely marginalisation paradoxes. While addressing some computational issues, the book does not mention the derivation of the Jeffreys prior for mixtures Clara Grazian and I examined. The chapter ends by a rather expedited dismissal of maximum entropy. Which many still regard as the default approach to (partly informed) objective prior modelling. (They’ll be back in Chapter 13.)

The last hundred pages (Chap. 9-14) of the book are focussing on reference priors, as should be given the priorities of the authors. Starting with the rather convincing concept of maximising missing information, getting asymptotic to remove the impact of the data, and turning recursive in case of multidimensional parameters, while resorting to compact parameter spaces to avoid improprieties (the Achille’s heel of reference priors!). Reaching a definition (p176) in the univariate case that coherently does not depend on the sample size but on an arbitrary dominating measure (p179), interestingly sharing this feature with the definition of conjugate priors. In multivariate settings, things get… more complicated! And force a separation between nuisance and interesting parameters lest the resulting priors prove underperforming. Asymptotic normality again helps, but the derivation remains involved witness a one page (p201) theorem (Proposition 10.2).  My favourite example of selecting the prior for a Normal mean squared norm is there, with the original Jeffreys prior based on the Normal vector failing badly while the reference prior based on the norm of the observation does much better! (An open problem is the construction of the Jeffreys prior in that example.) A large table (p210) illustrates the plethora of reference priors depending on the parameter ordering. A short chapter (11) specialises on discrete parameters as in population sizes. And in model choice, a resolution I had not seen previously, with prior weights depending on the number of parameters in the respective models. But not accounting for embedded models. Chapter 12 addresses the “overall objective” prior construction when all parameters are equal (and none more equal than others). Supporting in the end the best overall prior defined in terms of distance to a family of reference priors. With a special treatment of the hierarchical Normal model following Berger & al. (2020). Chapter 13 is a short incursion into partial information reference priors, incl. maxent priors. Chapter 14 is about special reference priors exploiting special structures. And, at last, Chapter 15 a non-chapter pointing out to a catalogue of objective priors, following Yang & Berger (1997) as well as an initiative set during one of the O’Bayes meetings.

On the minor (nitpicking) side, I found a few “the the” (the typo no one can escape!) throughout the book, informality in some statements like Proposition 1.6, whose limit (in n) depends on n (a shortcut from which we try to wean our students). Also a somewhat anecdotal appearance of the ratio of uniforms algorithm with a mistaken statement that the method doesn’t depend on a proposal (p61), the references to Jeffreys’ main book clashing between the 1930s  and 1961 (final edition). The “random posterior” section 1.8 6 seems unfinished.

In conclusion, this much awaited reference book does deliver! It brings a perspective on reference priors that no other book does and reflects (well) on the authors’ careful completion of a coherent theory, hence should appeal to anyone working on the foundations and principles of Bayesian inference. Obviously, it will not change the position of strict subjectivists, nor convince non-Bayesians, but it should inspire current and future researchers, as well as complement graduate courses on Bayesian inference. In addition, the huge bibliography retraces the work in the area till today (if less intensely in the most recent years). Kudos to the authors, then!

[Disclaimer about potential self-plagiarism: this post or an edited version will eventually appear in my Books Review section in CHANCE!]

integral priors for multiple comparison

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , on June 24, 2024 by xi'an

Diego Salmerón and I just arXived a paper on integral priors for multiple model comparison, about deriving reference priors for multiple hypothesis testing. As (so-called) noninformative priors constructed for estimation purposes are usually not appropriate for model selection and testing due to their improperness, Jeffreys-Lindley paradoxes and the like, the methodology of integral priors was developed to get prior distributions for Bayesian model selection when comparing two models, modifying initial improper reference priors. This paper proposes a generalization of this methodology when than two models are to be compared. In order to avoid the above paradoxes and the associated possibility of producing a null recurrent or transient Markov chain, our approach adds an artificial copy of each model under comparison by compactifying the corresponding parametric space and creates an ergodic Markov chain exploring all models that returns the integral priors as marginals of the ergodic and stationary joint distribution. Besides the guarantee of existence of these integral priors and the disappearance of paradoxes that plague estimation reference priors, an additional perk of this methodology is that the simulation of this Markov chain is straightforward as it only requires simulations of imaginary training samples and from the corresponding posterior distributions, for all models, while producing Bayes factor approximations on the side. This renders its implementation automatic and generic, both in the nested and in the nonnested cases. We associated our late friend Juan Antonio Cano to this paper as he was instrumental in initiating both this collaboration and the methodology at its core.

Mea Culpa

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , , , , , , , , on April 10, 2020 by xi'an

[A quote from Jaynes about improper priors that I had missed in his book, Probability Theory.]

For many years, the present writer was caught in this error just as badly as anybody else, because Bayesian calculations with improper priors continued to give just the reasonable and clearly correct results that common sense demanded. So warnings about improper priors went unheeded; just that psychological phenomenon. Finally, it was the marginalization paradox that forced recognition that we had only been lucky in our choice of problems. If we wish to consider an improper prior, the only correct way of doing it is to approach it as a well-defined limit of a sequence of proper priors. If the correct limiting procedure should yield an improper posterior pdf for some parameter α, then probability theory is telling us that the prior information and data are too meager to permit any inferences about α. Then the only remedy is to seek more data or more prior information; probability theory does not guarantee in advance that it will lead us to a useful answer to every conceivable question.Generally, the posterior pdf is better behaved than the prior because of the extra information in the likelihood function, and the correct limiting procedure yields a useful posterior pdf that is analytically simpler than any from a proper prior. The most universally useful results of Bayesian analysis obtained in the past are of this type, because they tended to be rather simple problems, in which the data were indeed so much more informative than the prior information that an improper prior gave a reasonable approximation – good enough for all practical purposes – to the strictly correct results (the two results agreed typically to six or more significant figures).

In the future, however, we cannot expect this to continue because the field is turning to more complex problems in which the prior information is essential and the solution is found by computer. In these cases it would be quite wrong to think of passing to an improper prior. That would lead usually to computer crashes; and, even if a crash is avoided, the conclusions would still be, almost always, quantitatively wrong. But, since likelihood functions are bounded, the analytical solution with proper priors is always guaranteed to converge properly to finite results; therefore it is always possible to write a computer program in such a way (avoid underflow, etc.) that it cannot crash when given proper priors. So, even if the criticisms of improper priors on grounds of marginalization were unjustified,it remains true that in the future we shall be concerned necessarily with proper priors.