Archive for likelihood ratio

mixture models [book review]

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on August 14, 2024 by xi'an

Strangely enough, I became aware of this new book on mixtures through one of these annoying emails “Your work has been cited n times this week“… Mixture Models (Parametric, Semiparametric, and New Directions) by Weixin Yao and Sijia Wang got published by CRC Press earlier this year, within the Monographs on Statistics and Applied Probability green series (#175), and covers across 380 pages most aspects of mixture (and hidden Markov) estimation, if with strong emphasis on maximum likelihood estimation, while the new directions are unsurprisingly those pursued by the authors, namely robust and semi-parametric estimation, as well as model selection by testing.

An early warning about this book review is that I co-edited a Handbook of Mixture Analysis with my friends Sylvia Früwirth-Schnatter and Gilles Celeux a few years ago. I am therefore biased in what I would have included in a new book on the topic, the more because I find the available literature already plentiful, even though the early (1984) book of Titterington et al. that was my entry to the field may have become an historical reference. For instance, Finite Mixtures by McLachlan and Peel (2000) remains relevant, with similar emphasis on maximum likelihood and the EM algorithm, while Sylvia’s Finite Mixture and Markov Switching Models is still a reference to this day.

And an additional warning on me not being a massive fan of semi- and non-parametric estimation in this setting…

Preliminaries that may explain my limited enthusiasm about the book and its limited originality. Not that I found significant errors there (even though “improper priors [do not always] yield improper posteriors” [p.145] as we demonstrated in several papers), however, I had trouble with the uneven pace adopted by the authors that often skim some topics of importance while spending an inconsiderate amount of space on less relevant once. Some items get many bibliographical references, while others do not. For instance, EM receives a lion’s share (see, e..g, Sections 6.6 and 6.7). Or the 12 pages of proof in Chapter 10. Declination of sections into mixtures, mixtures of regressions, multivariate mixtures, hidden Markov models, and so on feels somewhat repetitive. This is particularly the case for the “mixture regression models” chapter.

The book also contains Bayesian entries, with a first introduction (p.105) in the discrete data chapter that precedes the short Bayesian chapter #4 (p.145), the same issue arising for related algorithms like Gibbs (p.107) that “estimate properties of the joint posterior” and MCMC (p.112). Which sort of erases the specificity of a Bayesian approach by reducing it to one item in the toolbox (with the wrong stress on MAP estimates). In this Bayesian chapter, MCMC validation is handled for discrete state spaces while applied in general spaces. The focus is mostly on relabelling for the following label switching chapter, albeit a large collection of methods are compared if not mentioned.

Handing an unknown number of components by hypothesis testing is supported in the next short chapter, although very little is said about reversible jump MCMC. And there is no general discussion on the consistency of these tests, in particular with bootstrap. Or at least on the regularity conditions they request. An puzzling paradox (p.191) is the existence of an unbounded Fisher information of an exponential mixture

\pi\mathcal Exp(1)+(1-\pi)\mathcal Exp(2)

when the weight π is the parameter (and close to 1).

High-dimensional mixtures in Chapter 8 are mostly handled by linear projections in smaller subspaces, which is natural given that they preserve the mixture structure but open a Pandora box of a wide range of proposed methods, again with little comparison available. Except in the R final section opposing several R functions on the same dataset (if unconclusively).

The semi-parametric chapters mention Dirichlet process priors, albeit briefly, but fail to relate to the recent works on using these when inferring about the number of components. Or failing to do so. There is also a very limited connection pointed out with machine learning but little can be gathered from the three page presentation (pp.308-310). These chapters also have significant overlap with the review paper of Xiang et al. (2019) in Statistical Science.

Most chapters end up with an R section, which usually reads as a quick demo of a related R package, like BayesLCA or our own mixtool. Hence not massively helpful beyond pointers to these packages. The numerical illustrations also are unevenly distributed between chapters, from nothing at all to four pages of small font tables on an MSE comparison between more or less robust approaches undertaken by Yu et al. (2020).

The above thus explains why I am not particularly excited about this bibliographical addition to the analysis of mixtures. It does offer a reference for researchers in the field by adding recent references and approaches to the existing books mentioned above, but I could not recommend it as a textbook (as suggested on p.xiii).

[Disclaimer about potential self-plagiarism: this post or an edited version may eventually appear in my Books Review section in CHANCE.]

dodging bullets, IEDs, and fingerprint detection at SimStat19

Posted in pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 10, 2019 by xi'an

I attended a fairly interesting forensic science session at SimStat 2019 in Salzburg as it concentrated on evidence and measures of evidence rather than on strict applications of Bayesian methodology to forensic problems. Even though American administrations like the FBI or various police departments were involved. It was a highly coherent session and I had a pleasant discussion with some of the speakers after the session. For instance, my friend Alicia Carriquiry presented an approach to determined from images of bullets whether or not they have been fired from the same gun, leading to an interesting case for a point null hypothesis where the point null makes complete sense. The work has been published in Annals of Applied Statistics and is used in practice. The second talk by Danica Ommen on fiducial forensics on IED, asking whether or not copper wires used in the bombs are the same, which is another point null illustration. Which also set an interesting questioning on the dependence of the alternative prior on the distribution of material chosen as it is supposed to cover all possible origins for the disputed item. But more interestingly this talk launched into a discussion of making decision based on finite samplers and unknown parameters, not that specific to forensics, with a definitely surprising representation of the Bayes factor as an expected likelihood ratio which made me first reminiscent of Aitkin’s (1991) infamous posterior likelihood (!) before it dawned on me this was a form of bridge sampling identity where the likelihood ratio only involved parameters common to both models, making it an expression well-defined under both models. This identity could be generalised to the general case by considering a ratio of integrated likelihoods, the extreme case being the ratio equal to the Bayes factor itself. The following two talks by Larry Tang and Christopher Saunders were also focused on the likelihood ratio and their statistical estimates, debating the coherence of using a score function and presenting a functional ABC algorithm where the prior is a Dirichlet (functional) prior. Thus a definitely relevant session from a Bayesian perspective!

 

a paradox about likelihood ratios?

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , on January 15, 2018 by xi'an

Aware of my fascination for paradoxes (and heterodox publications), Ewan Cameron sent me the link to a recent arXival by Louis Lyons (Oxford) on different asymptotic distributions of the likelihood ratio. Which is full of approximations. The overall point of the note is hard to fathom… Unless it simply plans to illustrate Betteridge’s law of headlines, as suggested by Ewan.

For instance, the limiting distribution of the log-likelihood of an exponential sample at the true value of the parameter τ is not asymptotically Gaussian but almost surely infinite. While the log of the (Wilks) likelihood ratio at the true value of τ is truly (if asymptotically) a Χ² variable with one degree of freedom. That it is not a Gaussian is deemed a “paradox” by the author, explained by a cancellation of first order terms… Same thing again for the common Gaussian mean problem!

two, three, five, …, a million standard deviations!

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , on September 26, 2014 by xi'an

I first spotted Peter Coles’ great post title “Frequentism: the art of probably answering the wrong question” (a very sensible piece by the way!, and mentioning a physicist’s view on the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox I had intended to comment) and from there the following site jumping occured:

“I confess that in my early in my career as a physicist I was rather cynical about sophisticated statistical tools, being of the opinion that “if any of this makes a difference, just get more data”. That is, if you do enough experiments, the confidence level will be so high that the exact statistical treatment you use to evaluate it is irrelevant.” John Butterworth, Sept. 15, 2014

After Val Johnson‘s suggestion to move the significant level from .05 down to .005, hence roughly from 2σ up to 3σ, John Butterworth, a physicist whose book Smashing Physics just came out, discusses in The Guardian the practice of using 5σ in Physics. It is actually induced by Louis Lyons’ arXival of a recent talk with the following points (discussed below):

  1. Should we insist on the 5 sigma criterion for discovery claims?
  2. The probability of A, given B, is not the same as the probability of B, given A.
  3. The meaning of p-values.
  4. What is Wilks Theorem and when does it not apply?
  5. How should we deal with the `Look Elsewhere Effect’?
  6. Dealing with systematics such as background parametrisation.
  7. Coverage: What is it and does my method have the correct coverage?
  8. The use of p0 versus p1 plots.

Continue reading →

who’s afraid of the big B wolf?

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , on March 13, 2013 by xi'an

Aris Spanos just published a paper entitled “Who should be afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox?” in the journal Philosophy of Science. This piece is a continuation of the debate about frequentist versus llikelihoodist versus Bayesian (should it be Bayesianist?! or Laplacist?!) testing approaches, exposed in Mayo and Spanos’ Error and Inference, and discussed in several posts of the ‘Og. I started reading the paper in conjunction with a paper I am currently writing for a special volume in  honour of Dennis Lindley, paper that I will discuss later on the ‘Og…

“…the postdata severity evaluation (…) addresses the key problem with Fisherian p-values in the sense that the severity evaluation provides the “magnitude” of the warranted discrepancy from the null by taking into account the generic capacity of the test (that includes n) in question as it relates to the observed data”(p.88)

First, the antagonistic style of the paper is reminding me of Spanos’ previous works in that it relies on repeated value judgements (such as “Bayesian charge”, “blatant misinterpretation”, “Bayesian allegations that have undermined the credibility of frequentist statistics”, “both approaches are far from immune to fallacious interpretations”, “only crude rules of thumbs”, &tc.) and rhetorical sleights of hand. (See, e.g., “In contrast, the severity account ensures learning from data by employing trustworthy evidence (…), the reliability of evidence being calibrated in terms of the relevant error probabilities” [my stress].) Connectedly, Spanos often resorts to an unusual [at least for statisticians] vocabulary that amounts to newspeak. Here are some illustrations: “summoning the generic capacity of the test”, ‘substantively significant”, “custom tailoring the generic capacity of the test”, “the fallacy of acceptance”, “the relevance of the generic capacity of the particular test”, yes the term “generic capacity” is occurring there with a truly high frequency. Continue reading →