Archive for missing values

model uncertainty and missing data: an objective BAyesian perspective

Posted in Books, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 16, 2025 by xi'an

My Spanish and objective Bayesian friends Gonzalo García-Donato, María Eugenia Castellanos, Stefano Cabras, Alicia Quirós, and Anabel Forte wrote an fairly exciting paper in BA that is open to discussion (for a few more days), to be discussed on 05 November (4:00 PM UTC | 11:00 AM EST | 5:00 PM CET).

The interplay between missing data and model uncertainty—two classic statistical problems—leads to primary questions that we formally address from an objective Bayesian perspective. For the general regression problem, we discuss the probabilistic justification of Rubin’s rules applied to the usual components of Bayesian variable selection, arguing that prior predictive marginals should be central to the pursued methodology. In the regression settings, we explore the conditions of prior distributions that make the missing data mechanism ignorable, provided that it is missing at random or completely at random. Moreover, when comparing multiple linear models, we provide a complete methodology for dealing with special cases, such as variable selection or uncertainty regarding model errors. In numerous simulation experiments, we demonstrate that our method outperforms or equals others, in consistently producing results close to those obtained using the full dataset. In general, the difference increases with the percentage of missing data and the correlation between the variables used for imputation.

The so-called Rubin’s identity is simply the representation of the posterior probability of a model γ given the observed data x⁰, p(γ|x⁰), as the integrated posterior probability of a model given both observed and latent data,  p(γ|x⁰, x¹), against the marginal of latent x¹ given observed x⁰. Since this marginal involves the probabilities p(γ|x⁰), this representation is not directly useful for a numerical implementation.

In this paper, missingness relates to some entries of either the covariates or the response variate. Which is less common but more realistic, especially if some covariates do not contribute to the response. (The missingness mechanism does not matter if the data is missing at random (à la Rubin). The computational solution (p9) is rather standard, simulating the missing variables given the observed variables. In my opinion, the elephant in the room is the super-delicate selection of a prior distribution on the missing covariates, as methinks this impacts in a considerable manner the actual value of the Bayes factor, hence the selection of the surviving model. (As a side remark, we are credited in Celeux et al. (2006) to have “extended DIC for missing data models or when missing data were present”, but our point was instead to point out the arbitrariness of the very definition of DIC in such contexts.)

“The standard Bayesian method for addressing the absence of prior information uses improper distributions. In estimation problems (the model is fixed), the impropriety of priors does not imply any additional difficulty as long as the posterior is proper” (p9)

The authors point out the well-known difficulty with improper priors but still resort to improper priors on the parameters shared by all models—which I dispute as being adequate, despite the arguments put forward on p15, right Haar measure or not—, while sticking to proper priors on the model-dependent parameters. Which unsurprisingly become Zellner’s g-priors. Or rather g’-priors, although the discussion seems to resolve into the (model-free) factor g’ being equal to 1 as for the g-priors. Again a strong term in the derivation of the Bayes factor.

observed vs. complete in EM algorithm

Posted in Statistics with tags , , , , , on November 17, 2022 by xi'an

While answering a question related with the EM  algorithm on X validated, I realised a global (or generic) feature of the (objective) E function, namely that

E(\theta'|\theta)=\mathbb E_{\theta}[\log\,f_{X,Z}(x^\text{obs},Z|\theta')|X=x^\text{obs}]

can always be written as

\log\,f_X(x^\text{obs};\theta')+\mathbb E_{\theta}[\log\,f_{Z|X}(Z|x^\text{obs},\theta')|X=x^\text{obs}]

therefore always includes the (log-) observed likelihood, at least in this formal representation. While the proof that EM is monotonous in the values of the observed likelihood uses this decomposition as well, in that

\log\,f_X(x^\text{obs};\theta')=\log\,\mathbb E_{\theta}\left[\frac{f_{X,Z}(x^\text{obs},Z;\theta')}{f_{Z|X}(Z|x^\text{obs},\theta)}\big|X=x^\text{obs}\right]

I wonder if the appearance of the actual target in the temporary target E(θ’|θ) can be exploited any further.

Statistics slides (4)

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , on November 10, 2014 by xi'an

La Défense from Paris-Dauphine, Nov. 15, 2012Here is the fourth set of slides for my third year statistics course, trying to build intuition about the likelihood surface and why on Earth would one want to find its maximum?!, through graphs. I am yet uncertain whether or not I will reach the point where I can teach more asymptotics so maybe I will also include asymptotic normality of the MLE under regularity conditions in this chapter…

10 Little’s simple ideas

Posted in Books, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , , , on July 17, 2013 by xi'an

“I still feel that too much of academic statistics values complex mathematics over elegant simplicity — it is necessary for a research paper to be complicated in order to be published.” Roderick Little, JASA, p.359

Roderick Little wrote his Fisher lecture, recently published in JASA, around ten simple ideas for statistics. Its title is “In praise of simplicity not mathematistry! Ten simple powerful ideas for the statistical scientist”. While this title is rather antagonistic, blaming mathematical statistics for the rise of mathematistry in the field (a term borrowed from Fisher, who also invented the adjective ‘Bayesian’), the paper focus on those 10 ideas and very little on why there is (would be) too much mathematics in statistics:

  1. Make outcomes univariate
  2. Bayes rule, for inference under an assumed model
  3. Calibrated Bayes, to keep inference honest
  4. Embrace well-designed simulation experiments
  5. Distinguish the model/estimand, the principles of estimation, and computational methods
  6. Parsimony — seek a good simple model, not the “right” model
  7. Model the Inclusion/Assignment and try to make it ignorable
  8. Consider dropping parts of the likelihood to reduce the modeling part
  9. Potential outcomes and principal stratification for causal inferenc
  10. Statistics is basically a missing data problem

“The mathematics of problems with infinite parameters is interesting, but with finite sample sizes, I would rather have a parametric model. “Mathematistry” may eschew parametric models because the asymptotic theory is too simple, but they often work well in practice.” Roderick Little, JASA, p.365

Both those rules and the illustrations that abund in the paper are reflecting upon Little’s research focus and obviously apply to his model in a fairly coherent way. However, while a mostly parametric model user myself, I fear the rejection of non-parametric techniques is far too radical. It is more and more my convinction that we cannot handle the full complexity of a realistic structure in a standard Bayesian manner and that we have to give up on the coherence and completeness goals at some point… Using non-parametrics and/or machine learning on some bits and pieces then makes sense, even though it hurts elegance and simplicity.

“However, fully Bayes inference requires detailed probability modeling, which is often a daunting task. It seems worth sacrifycing some Bayesian inferential purity if the task can be simplified.” Roderick Little, JASA, p.366

I will not discuss those ideas in detail, as some of them make complete sense to me (like Bayesian statistics laying its assumptions in the open) and others remain obscure (e.g., causality) or with limited applicability. It is overall a commendable Fisher lecture that focus on methodology and the practice of statistical science, rather than on theory. I however do not see the reason why maths should be blamed for this state of the field. Nor why mathematical statistics journals like AoS would carry some responsibility in the lack of further applicability in other fields.  Students of statistics do need a strong background in mathematics and I fear we are losing ground in this respect, at least judging by the growing difficulty in finding measure theory courses abroad for our exchange undergradutes from Paris-Dauphine. (I also find the model misspecification aspects mostly missing from this list.)