Archive for reference prior

model uncertainty and missing data: an objective BAyesian perspective

Posted in Books, Statistics, Travel, University life with tags , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 16, 2025 by xi'an

My Spanish and objective Bayesian friends Gonzalo García-Donato, María Eugenia Castellanos, Stefano Cabras, Alicia Quirós, and Anabel Forte wrote an fairly exciting paper in BA that is open to discussion (for a few more days), to be discussed on 05 November (4:00 PM UTC | 11:00 AM EST | 5:00 PM CET).

The interplay between missing data and model uncertainty—two classic statistical problems—leads to primary questions that we formally address from an objective Bayesian perspective. For the general regression problem, we discuss the probabilistic justification of Rubin’s rules applied to the usual components of Bayesian variable selection, arguing that prior predictive marginals should be central to the pursued methodology. In the regression settings, we explore the conditions of prior distributions that make the missing data mechanism ignorable, provided that it is missing at random or completely at random. Moreover, when comparing multiple linear models, we provide a complete methodology for dealing with special cases, such as variable selection or uncertainty regarding model errors. In numerous simulation experiments, we demonstrate that our method outperforms or equals others, in consistently producing results close to those obtained using the full dataset. In general, the difference increases with the percentage of missing data and the correlation between the variables used for imputation.

The so-called Rubin’s identity is simply the representation of the posterior probability of a model γ given the observed data x⁰, p(γ|x⁰), as the integrated posterior probability of a model given both observed and latent data,  p(γ|x⁰, x¹), against the marginal of latent x¹ given observed x⁰. Since this marginal involves the probabilities p(γ|x⁰), this representation is not directly useful for a numerical implementation.

In this paper, missingness relates to some entries of either the covariates or the response variate. Which is less common but more realistic, especially if some covariates do not contribute to the response. (The missingness mechanism does not matter if the data is missing at random (à la Rubin). The computational solution (p9) is rather standard, simulating the missing variables given the observed variables. In my opinion, the elephant in the room is the super-delicate selection of a prior distribution on the missing covariates, as methinks this impacts in a considerable manner the actual value of the Bayes factor, hence the selection of the surviving model. (As a side remark, we are credited in Celeux et al. (2006) to have “extended DIC for missing data models or when missing data were present”, but our point was instead to point out the arbitrariness of the very definition of DIC in such contexts.)

“The standard Bayesian method for addressing the absence of prior information uses improper distributions. In estimation problems (the model is fixed), the impropriety of priors does not imply any additional difficulty as long as the posterior is proper” (p9)

The authors point out the well-known difficulty with improper priors but still resort to improper priors on the parameters shared by all models—which I dispute as being adequate, despite the arguments put forward on p15, right Haar measure or not—, while sticking to proper priors on the model-dependent parameters. Which unsurprisingly become Zellner’s g-priors. Or rather g’-priors, although the discussion seems to resolve into the (model-free) factor g’ being equal to 1 as for the g-priors. Again a strong term in the derivation of the Bayes factor.

Bertrand’s paradox [re]solved?

Posted in Books, pictures, Statistics, Travel with tags , , , , , , , , , , , on September 29, 2023 by xi'an

On the plane back from Vancouver, I read Bertrand’s Paradox Resolution and Its Implications for the Bing–Fisher Problem by Richard A. Chechile [who had pointed out his paper to me] In this paper, Chechile considers the Bayesian connections/sequences of Betrand’s paradox, as he sees it Bertrand’s different solutions/paradox to be

“designed to illustrate his dissatisfaction with the Bayes and Laplace use of a probability distribution to represent an unknown parameter that can have any continuous value”

and proposes to “resolve” this paradox, which imho is neither a paradox nor in need of a resolution!, as I see it more like a reflection on the importance of sigma algebras and measure theory. The uniform distribution (behind the “random” chord) is not a uniquely specified concept, just like the maximum entropy distribution is relative to the dominating measure. When arguing that

“Such a definition [based on any possible distribution of a stochastic chord] would yield a random variable, but this weak sense of the word random is not satisfactory, because there is an infinite number of stochastic processes that can be defined to yield a probability distribution of chord lengths.”

the author is simply restating that infinite collection of dominating measures.  But imho he is somewhat missing this point when defining Shannon`s entropy by resorting to a discrete version. And when adopting a uniform measure on the chord as a reference (Section 3.2, on The Importance of a Dominant Metric Representation). While the probability P(L>1) is invariant under any increasing transform of L (and 1)… This amounts to arguing for a favourite parameterisation in constructing  a reference prior (Section 4, where Jeffreys prior is also dismissed for not being at maximum entropy). The ensuing discussion as to why the three solutions of Bertrand’s are not valid (Section 2.2) is thus most curious to me since they all are implementable/practical ways of producing stochastic chords. I find it rather amusing that one returns to the quest for the ideal priori distribution Bayesians were so fiercely debating at the turn of the previous century. And non-Bayesians were all too happy to exploit when arguing against this approach.

no country for odd means

Posted in Books, Kids, Statistics, University life with tags , , , , , , on November 16, 2015 by xi'an

This morning, Clara Grazian and I arXived a paper about Jeffreys priors for mixtures. This is a part of Clara’s PhD dissertation between Roma and Paris, on which she has worked for the past year. Jeffreys priors cannot be computed analytically for mixtures, which is such a drag that it led us to devise the delayed acceptance algorithm. However, the main message from this detailed study of Jeffreys priors is that they mostly do not work for Gaussian mixture models, in that the posterior is almost invariably improper! This is a definite death knell for Jeffreys priors in this setting, meaning that alternative reference priors, like the one we advocated with Kerrie Mengersen and Mike Titterington, or the similar solution in Roeder and Wasserman, have to be used. [Disclaimer: the title has little to do with the paper, except that posterior means are off for mixtures…]

SAMSI workshop

Posted in Statistics, Travel with tags , , , , on March 22, 2010 by xi'an

Taking advantage of the people gathered at Frontiers of Statistical Decision Making and Bayesian Analysis, Dongchu Sun organised a one-day SAMSI workshop on reference priors for spatio-temporal models. Talking with a small group focused on this  topic was quite enjoyable and a change from the larger crowds at the conference (even though talks were also enjoyable there!). I particularly appreciated the discussion we had around AR(p) models and the difficulty of assessing whether or not non-stationary regions should be included in the analysis. The generalisation of the Berger-Yang (1994) paradigm to general values of p seems to put too much mass on the non-stationary region, even when using a symmetrisation technique… I came out of the meeting (exhausted and) wondering whether or not it was at all meaningfull to consider testing for stationarity, even though Bayes factors can be constructed in this setting.

Model choice by Kullback projection

Posted in Statistics with tags , , on February 3, 2009 by xi'an

Nott and Leng just posted a paper on ArXiv that expands on previous papers of ours (Dupuis and Robert, written in 1998, published in 2003; Goutis and Robert, 1998) by incorporating a Lasso perspective. Besides the fact that it relates to one of my preferred papers—Kullback-Leibler projections being a natural way for me to propagate priors on submodels when defining a single prior on the “big” or encompassing model—, it contains interesting extensions, one being that they can achieve a consistency result (while I am not sure our approach always was consistent) and the other that the computation of the projection is made much easier via the Lasso perspective. One may wonder where the Lasso appears in this setting, but using a dual Lagrangian representation of the Lasso penalty as a L1 ball or something similar means defining a parameter subspace as a ball indeed. Computing the projected parameters is then equivalent to finding a Lasso estimate, Further, because the Lasso perspective allows for all possible submodels, the need to approximately explore the tree of submodels that was a problem with Dupuis and Robert (2003) vanishes. Also interestingly, although the Lasso defines a single constraint, all submodels—in the classical sense of variable selection—can be assessed from this perspective as well.

There is however one point with which I disagree, namely that the predictive on the submodel is obtained in the current paper by projecting a Monte Carlo or an MCMC sample from the predictive on the full model, while I think this is incorrect because the likelihood is then computed using the parameter for the full model. Using a projection of such a sample means at least reweighting by the ratio of the likelihoods…